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[L. A. No. 20275. In Bank. Nov. 21,1947.]

JOHN E. LOUST ALOT, as Sheriit, etc., Petitioner, v. THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF KERN COUNTY et at,
Respondents.
[1] Wortmen's Oompensation-Oertiorari.-In the exercise of its
normal jurisdiction with respect to compensation awards or
safety rules. the decisions of the Industrial Accident Commission are subject to review only by the method set forth
in the workmen's compensation law, which is by an application for a writ of review in an appellate court. (Lab. Code,
§§ 5810. 5950. 5955. 6600. 6601.)
[I] Id.-Oertiorarl-Scope of Beview.-In Lab. Code, § 5955, de~
claring that no court other than the Supreme Court and the
,.
District Conrts of Appeal "to the extent herein specified" has
jurisdiction to review any decision of the Industrial Accident
Commission, the Quoted words refer, not to the method. but
to the extent of the review, namely, the extent to which a
court having jurisdiction ean review the decision as speeifled
in ~§ 5952. nlln3.

[1] See 27 Oal.Jur. 570.
KcK. Dig. References: [1, 5] Workmen's Compensation, § 261;
[2] Workmen's Compensation, § 267; [3, 4] Workmen's Compenaation, § 277.1; [6] Habeas Corpus, § 73.
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[3] ld.-Habeas Corpus.-Exoept in so far as review of commission action by habeas corpus might involve the validity of a
oompensation award or safety rule, the writ of habeas corpus
is available to attack the validity of an order of the Industrial
Accident Commission imprisoning one for contempt.
[4] Id.-Habeas Corpus.-In view of the faot that superior courts
under Lab. Code, § 5955, have no jurisdiction to review or
annul a decision of the Industrial Accident Commission, such
a oourt does not have jurisdiotion to issue a writ of habeas
corpus on the ground of invalidity of an order of the commission imprisoning one for contempt.
[6] ld. - Judicial Beview.-An order of the Industrial Accident
Commission, even though erroneous, may not be reviewed or
annulled by the superior court and must stand as a proper
and legal order unless reversed by the Supreme Court or by
a District Court of Appeal.
[6] Habeas Corpus-AppeaL-No appeal lies from a decision of
a superior court on habeas corpus unless under Pen. Code,
§ 1506, it constitutes an order discharging a person convicted
of an offense prosecuted by indictment or information.

PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior
Court of Kern County, and W. L. Bradshaw, Judge thereof,
from taking further steps in a habeas corpus proceeding. Writ
granted.
Tom Scott, District Attorney, R. C. McKellips and Elvin
B. Connolly for Petitioner.
V. P. DiGiorgio for Respondentl.
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner, the sherifr of Kern County,
California, seeks a writ of prohibition to restrain further proceedings in the Superior Court in and for the County of
Kern in the matter of the application of Earl 14. Price, hereinafter referred to as defendant, for a writ of habeas corpus.
Defendant mailed a letter to the Industrial Accident Commission of California censuring a deeision of that commission
in a proceeding in which he was concerned. The commission
adjudged defendant to be in contempt, and ordered that he
be delivered to the custody of petitioner and that petitioner
collect a fine of $50 from him or, in default thereof, that defendant be committed to the Kern County jail for a term
of five days. Defendant refused to pay the fine and was committed to the county jail. He then filed an a.pplication for
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a writ of habeas corpus in the Kern County Superior Court
questioning the power of the Industrial Accident Commission
to commit him to jail for mailing the letter. Honorable W. L.
Bradshaw, the judge presiding in department two of that
court, granted the writ but subsequently transferred the cause
to the. District Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District,
on the ground that the superior court was without jurisdiction. The District Court of Appeal (in re Price, 4 Crim.,
585, July 8, 1947) ordered the matter retransferred to the
Superior Court of Kern County, where the matter is now
pending.
The alternative writ of prohibition was granted to determine whether the superior court had jurisdiction to issue a
writ of habeas corpus in this matter. (Browne v. Superi.or
Court, 16 Cal.2d 593, 597 [107 P.2d 1, 131 A.L.R. 276].)
The Constitution of this state confers on the superior courts
jurisdiction to issue writs of "habeas corpus by or on behalf
of any person in actual custody. in their respective counties."
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 5.) Within their respective counties,
the jurisdiction of the superior courts under this provision
is generally considered concurrent with that of appellate
courts. (I'll. re Zany, 164 Cal. 724, 726 [130 P. 710]; I'll. re
Hugku, 159 Cal. 360, 364 [113 P. 684]; cf., however, France
v. Superior Court, 201 Cal. 122, 127 [255 P. 815, 52 A.L.R.
869].) Section 21 of article :xx of the California Constitution provides, however, that the Legislature is "vested with
plenary powers, unlimited by any provision of this Constitution, to create, and enforce a complete syBtem of workmen's
compensation, by appropriate leo<rislation. ••• " In creating
this system, the Legislature is likewise granted "plenary
powers" to fix and control "the manner of review of decisions
rendered by the tribunal or tribunals designated by it; proI vided, that all decisions of any such tribunal shall be sub• ject to review by the appellate courts of this State." There
are, therefore, two questions for decision with respect to the
jurisdiction of the superior court in this ease: whether the
Legislature has constitutionally fixed the manner of rtviewing
Industrial Accident Commission decisions so as to exclude
habeas corpus as an appropriate remedy, and whether the
Legislature has so fixed the manner of reviewing decisions
of the commission as to exclude superior courts from juris, diction to review or otherwise interfere with the order in
~ question.
•
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[1] In the exercise of its nonnal jurisdiction with respect
to compensation awards or safety rules, the decisions of the
commission are subject to review only by the methods set
forth in the workmen's compensation law. (Lab. Code, §§ 5810,
6600-6601, 5950, 5955.) In these sections the Legislature
has properly exercised its power to control the jurisdiction
of the courts in regard to workmen's compensation proceedings. (Thaxter v. Finn, 178 Cal. 270, 273 [173 P. 163] i
North Pacific S. S. Co. v. Soley, 193 Cal. 138, 140 [223 P. I
462J.) The question whether habeas corpus is available to
interfere with or review a contempt order of the commission is therefore solely one of statutory construction.
Section 5810 of the Labor Code provides that orders, decisions, or awards of the commission, made under division
four of the Labor Code, the provisions with respect to compensation proceedings, "may be reviewed by the courts specified in sections 5950 to 5956 within the time and in the manner
therein specified and not otherwise." The manner therein
specified is an application for a writ of review in an appellate
court after :filing a petition for rehearing with the commission
(Lab. Code, § 5950) or an application for a writ of mandate
in a proper ease. (Lab. Code, § 5955.) The courts specified
in those sections are the Supreme Court and the District
Courts of Appeal. (Ibid.) The scope of review afforded the
petitioner is specified in sections 5952 and 5953. The same
provisions are made the exclusive methods of review for proceedings under part one of division five of the Labor Code,
with respect to workmen's safety. Whatever contempt powers
the commission may have (a question not before this court
in the present proceeding) are provided in sections 133 and
134 of division one of the Labor Code. Sections 5810, 6600 and
6601 are not applicable to proceedings thereunder. Reference
to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1917 I
(Stats. 1917, p. 831) makes this conclusion abundantly clcar.
Sections 133 and 134 are continuations of section 63 of that
act. (Lab. Code, § 2.) Section 22 of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1917 upon which section 5810 is based, applied only to proceedings under sections 6 to 31 of that act.
Section 6600 and 6601, governing safety proceedings, are
based on section 45 of the 1917 act and that section applied
only to decisions under the safety provisions of the act.
[2] It has been suggested in one District Court of Appeal
decision, however, that section 5955 prohibits court review of!:
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any decision or order of the commission except by writ of
review after a petition for rehearing. (See Western Pipe
ct 8. Co. v. IndustriaZ Acc. Com., 119 Cal.App. 19, 20 [5 P.2d
920].) This section provides that, "No court of this State,
except the supreme court and the district courts of appeal
to the e.."ttent herein specified, has jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct, or annul any order, rule, decision, or award
of the commission • . • but a writ of mandate shan lie from
the supreme court or the district courts of appeal in all proper
eases." The suggested construction of section 5955 was unnecessary to the decision in that ease, for it was concemed
with the availability of the writ of prohibition in a compensation proceeding, a matter clearly controlled by section 5810.
The words "to the extent herein specified" in section 5955
refer, not to the method, but to the extent of the review,
namely, the extent to which a court having jurisdiction can
review the decision as specified in sections 5952 and 5953
of the Labor Code. Any other construction would make sections 5810, 6600 and 6601 superftuous.
It thus appears that the Legislature has not provided an
exclusive method of reviewing decisions of the commission
except in so far as compensation awards or safety rules are
involved. The decision in Brophy v. IndustriaZ Ace. Com., 46
;. Cal.App.2d 278 [115 P.2d 835], is in accord with this conclusion. In this case the court reviewed and annulled a contempt
, order of the commission without requiring that a petition for
rehearing be first filed with the commission. (See Brophy v.
" IttdwtriaZ Ace. Com., 6 Cal. Compo Cases 15, 16.) Implicit
, in that decision is the holding that the normal proceedings
. specified 'for the review of the commission's decisions or
orders (Lab. Code, § 5950) are inapplicable to the review of
, orders of the commission when the validity of compensation
, awards or safety rules are not involved. Moreover, the de,.,: eision of this court in In re Victor, 220 Cal. 729, 730 [32 P.2d
" 608], is authority for the proposition that habeas corpus is
, available to determine the jurisdiction of the commission to
, punish for contempt. As will hereafter appear, section 67
of the Public Utilities Act (Stat&. ex. aess. 1911, p. 55;
: Stats. 1915, p. 161; 2 Deering's Gen. Laws, 1944, Act 6386)
< contains substantially the same provision with regard to the
Publie Utilities Commission, as is contained in section 5955
of the Labor Code, except that jurisdiction is limited to the
:' Supreme Court. In the Victor case, this court granted a
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writ of habeas corpus to determine the validity of a contempt order of the Railroad Commission.
[3] Except in so far as review of commission action by
habeas corpus might involve the validity of a compensation
award or safety rule, that writ is available to attack the
validity of an order of the Industrial Accident Commission
imprisoning defendant for contempt. [4] It does not follow, however, that because habeas corpus is available to defendant, the superior court had jurisdiction to issue the writ
in this case. Although section 5955 does not provide an exclusive method for reviewing such orders or decisions, it
clearly defines the courts having jurisdiction to reverse, annul
or otherwise interfere with the operation of any order or
decision of the commission: "No court of this State, except
the supreme court and the district courts of appeal to the
extent herein specified, has jurisdiction to review, reverse,
correct, or annul any order, rule, decision, or award of the
commission, or to suspend or delay the operation or execution
thereof, or to restrain, enjoin, or interfere with the commission in the performance of its duties . .•. " (Italics added.)
This court has recognized the power of the Legislature under
section 21 of article XX of the Constitution to limit the jurisdiction of the courts in reviewing Industrial Accident Commission decisions. (Thaxter v. Finn, supra, 178 Cal. 270, 273;
North Pacific 8. S. Co. v. Soley, supra, 193 Cal. 138, 140;
see Hanna, Industrial Accident Commission Practice and
Procedure, 275.)
An examination of the legislative history of section 5955
and of the decisions construing the similar section of the
Public Utilities Act clearly shows that section 5955 means that
superior courts have no jurisdiction to review or otherwise
interfere with the operation of any order of the Industrial
Accident Commission. The first workmen's compensation act
in this state, the Roseberry Act, provided for review of decisions of the Industrial Accident Board by the superior
courts, subject to appeal to this court. (Stats. 1911, p. 804,
§ 18; see Great Western Power Co. v. p,msbury, 170 Cal. 180,
182 [149 P. 35].) At the time this act was passed the superior
courts had similar jurisdiction to annul decisions and orders
of the Railroad Commission. (Stats. 1909, p. 506, § 22.) In
the same year that the Roseberry Act was passed, an amendment to the Constitution was adopted granting the Legislature
full authority to confer any powers on the Railroad Com.mis-
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sion. (Art. XII, § 22, as amended October 10, 1911.) The
Legislature then pa..c:;sed the Public Utilities Act of 1911 which
provided in section 67 that, "No court of this state (except
the supreme court to the e.'ttent herein specified) shall have
jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct or annul any order
or decision of the commission or to suspend or delay the execution or operation thereof, or to enjoin, restrain or interfere
with the commission in the performance of its oftlcial duties;
provided that the writ of mandamus shall lie from the supreme court to the commission in all proper cases." (Stats.
Ex. Sess. 1911, p. 55; reenacted in Stats. 1915, p. 161.)
In 1913, the Legislature passed the second workmen's compensation act, known as the Boynton Act, creating the Industrial Accident Commission. Section 84 of that Act (Stats.
1913, p. 318) contains a provision that follows almost word for
word section 67 of the Public Utilities Act, except that jurisdiction to review, reverse, or annul commission orders or
decisions is conferred on both the Supreme Court and the District Courts of Appeal. In the same year this court held that
section 67 of the Public Utilities Act was a proper exercise of
the power conferred on the Legislature by the Constitution
to deprive superior courts of jurisdiction to review or interfere with decision of the Railroad Commission. (Pacific Telephone etc. Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 652, 658 [137 P.
1119, Ann.Cas. 1915C 822, 50 L.R.AN.S. 652].) Following
the decision in that case, the Legislature reenacted section 84
of the Boynton Act as section 67 of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1917. (Stats. 1917, p. 875.) Article XX, section 21 of the Constitution was then amended to its present
form, conferring plenary power of the Legislature to control
the review of Industrial Accident Commission decisions subject to the condition that decisions may be reviewed by the
appeUate courts. The amendment also ratified the creation
of the commission and all the functions vested therein. In
1937, the provision in question was incorporated into the
Labor Code without change as section 5955.
/
The foregoing legislative history shows without question
that section 67 of the Public Utilities Act provided the model
for section 5955 and that the decisions interpreting section 67
are likewise applicable thereto. The construction of section
67 of the Public Utilities Act adopted in the Pacift,c Telephone ,
. case, supra, has been followed in subsequent cases. (Sexton v.
; Atchison etc. Ry. Co., 173 Cal. 760, 762 [161 P. 748]; WGllace
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Ranch W. Co. v. Foothill D. Co., 5 Ca1.2d 103, 121 [53 P.2d
929}; People v. Hadley, 66 Cal.App. 370, 374 [226 P. 836];
Independent Laundry v. Railroad Com., 70 Cal.App.2d 816,
.822 [161 P.2d 827]; see Truck Owner. &; Shipper. Inc. v.
Superior Court, 194 Cal. 146, 152 [228 P. 19].) It is thus
settled that a superior court has "no jurisdiction directly or
indirectly to overrule an order of the railroad commission.
The power to reverse, review, correct or annul orders of that
commission rests solely in the Supreme Court (sec. 67 of the
Public Utilities Act, suprG) and the superior court is without
jurisdiction in the premises." (Wallace Ranch W. Co. v. Foothill D. Co., supra, at 121.) "Even though the order by the railroad commission be palpably erroneous in point of law, until
some order by the Supreme Court may be issued to the contrary, the original order of the commission must stand as a
proper and legal order in the premises. • • • Such being the
state of the law, it would follow that, as is provided by the act
itself, the only relief which the aggrieved party may have
from such an order is by or through a writ issued by the Supreme Court." (People v. Hadley, suprG, at 375.)
[6] Likewise, an order of the Industrial Accident Commission, even though erroneous, may not be reviewed or annulled
by the superior court and must stand as a proper and legal
order until reversed by this court or a District Court of Appeal. The only relief aJforded the aggrieved party is a writ
by this court or a District Court of Appeal. The Constitution
grants to the Legislature "plenary power, unlimited by any
pro'lJision 0/ this constitution, to create and enforce a complete
system of workmen's compensation, by appropriate legislation. • • ." Moreover, it is expressly declared to be "the social
public policy of this State, binding upon all departments of
the State government," that the Legislature have full power
to create a tribunal vested "with all the requisite governmental functions to determine any dispute or matter arising
under such legislation, to the end that the administration of
such legislation shall accomplish substantial justice in all
cases expeditiously, inexpensively, and wilhout encumbrGnce
0/ any cMracter• .••" (Article xx, § 21; italics added.)
The only limitation on this legislative power with respect to
the tribunal in question, is the provision for review of ita
decisions by this court and the District Courts of Appeal.
In restricting any interference with the commission's decisions or orders to proeeedinp in the appellate courts, the

)

i

!"

I!
I
Nov. 1947]

I

LoUSTALOT v. SUPERIOR COURT
[30 C.U 90S; l!1i P.2d 673]

913

Legislature has carried out the declared policy of the constitutional provision that the commission be unencumbered by
any but proceedings in the appellate courts. By granting a
petition for habeas corpus. the superior court clearly interferes with the operation of the commission's order. Moreover, if the superior eourt dise.bArged defendant, that decision
would have the effeet of annulling the commission's order.
Even if the commission's order is valid, the decision of the
superior court would be final. and not subject to review by
the appellate court.&. [6) No appeal lies from a decision
of a superior court on habea.s corpus (In re Zany, 164 Cal.
724, 726 [130 P. 710]), unless under the provision of section 1506 of the Penal Code it constitutes an order discharging
a person convicted oi an offense prosecuted by indictment or
information. (In re Page, 214 Cal. 350, 354 [5 P.2d 605];
In re A.lpine, 203 Cal. 731, 744, 745 [265 P. 947, 58 A.L.R.
1500]; In re JIurdock, 5 CaL2d 644, 646 [55 P.2d 843).) The
Legislature, in aeeord with the Constitution, has provided
that the legality of any order of the commission can be questioned only by the a.ppeD.ate eourts. Certainly, the superior
courts were not meant to have jurisdiction to determine finally
the legality of such an order. Any such interference with an
order of the commjssion m:JSt be considered an "encumbrance" on the administratkm of the workmen's compensation laws, within the power of the Legislature to prohibit. The
defendant, if unlawfully imprisoned, is not denied an adequate remedy, btrt must seek relief in an appellate court having jurisdiction to renew or annul the order in question.
Let a peremptory writ of prohibition issue as prayed.
Gibson, C. J., St..enk, J .. 'ES.monds, J., Carter, J., Schauer

J., and

Spen~

J..

ecm.ew~

